Jet Hours Aren't All Equal: Why Experienced Pilots Fail Assessments at Major Airlines

Roughly three in ten candidates pass an airline assessment. This doesn't change with experience. It can be a 1,500-hour first officer or a 10,000-hour captain, and the pass rate stays the same, in good times and bad. Experience gets you the invitation. It doesn't get you through the day.


During one of my first OPCs, the instructor paused the sim and asked me how long I'd been on the line. About a year, I told him. His blunt reply: "Well, it doesn't show."

He then compared our SOPs with what I was doing, and they weren't even the same thing.

I had trained at a university flight school with a healthy SOP culture, then joined what was pretty much a startup airline. Within a year my discipline drifted. The captains didn't use the SOPs as written, so I took my cue from them. I adapted to each captain rather than to an SOP or a collective way of doing things, and the script for every flight was different depending on the crew.

The second wake-up call came about six months later. A captain coming from a major airline asked me for the after start checklist, and I started reading out the items without announcing it. He stopped me. "You say 'after start checklist', you read the items, and at the end you say 'after start checklist complete'. This is how you do it." I thought he was extremely nitpicky as some captains didn't want the checklist at all. Some just nodded as a prompt. Only years later did I realise how right he was, and that I should have been doing it all along (thank you, T.J.).

As the airline grew, I had to unlearn and relearn: proper callouts, SOPs followed as written, procedures that even prescribed the exact words to say under certain conditions. At first it felt like we were making things harder for ourselves.

As an assessor, I witnessed the same development pattern in pilots of various experience levels.

Size matters

Airline flight ops and training departments work completely differently depending on fleet size.

Under 20 aircraft: the flying club

An airline with fewer than 20 aircraft is a family. People are hired through connections, and there's nothing wrong with that. It's a tight-knit community. But because everybody is pretty much on the same page, nobody sees the need for formal SOPs, so they're either not adopted or only paid lip service. Nothing is written down. It's mostly word of mouth; "how we do things around here".

There's little oversight, no robust training system, and everybody has their own idea of how it should be done. The result is a flying club mentality: flexible SOPs, a bit laissez-faire, a bit chaotic. From the inside it's very hard to notice, especially early in your career, because it's the only thing you know.

As there was no dress code outlined, I wore a shirt and jeans on my base training.

Around 50 aircraft: fixing what keeps going wrong

At around 50 aircraft, the biggest issues get set in stone. The safety events that keep recurring, and the reasons pilots keep failing sim checks get written into the SOPs. Most of them are tactical and immediately safety-critical: addressing taxiway excursions, runway incursions, missed clearances, altitude busts etc.

Over 100 aircraft: building standards

At around 100 aircraft, the airline starts working strategically. It builds a structured training regimen around how it wants its crews to behave, with a uniform skill set and uniform expectations. It's also hiring loads of pilots from different training and experience backgrounds, so it needs to bring the whole cohort to an even keel, and it designs its training and SOPs to do exactly that.

Size brings resources, and with them more focus on compliance and training management. That's what makes an SOP-focused culture possible. Training leaves very little to the individual instructor's interpretation, and even the walk-around is explained in detail, so that the whole flight operation works exactly the same way, whoever is in the seats. That's the airline mentality, and it's what the major airlines are assessing: how well you can adhere to very rigid SOPs.

The test

If you want to know which kind of operator, flight school or training organisation you socialised at, ask yourself four questions:

  1. Does each captain have their own SOPs?

  2. Do you have to radically change what you do between your simulator sessions and the line?

  3. On your annual line check, do you have to do things completely differently from what you normally do on the line, using SOPs that nobody actually uses day to day?

  4. Is the common explanation behind an action "In my previous company we used to do it like this", rather than "This is what the OM says"?

If you answered yes to any of them, you are likely accustomed to a flying club culture, however big the aircraft is.

Even air traffic control can tell

On a tower visit, the controllers told me they only give conditional clearances, the "line up and wait behind the landing traffic" kind, to the major airlines: the large low-costs and the legacies. Smaller operators, corporates and small ACMIs don't get them, because the controllers so often associate runway incursions, misheard clearances, or clearances that simply aren't followed with these kinds of operators.

That's down to organisational discipline, and to standardised SOPs.

Where it shows

An assessor can see it immediately. It shows in the interview, and it shows in the sim, and it starts with the briefing. Experienced pilots from smaller operators, including turboprop and corporate flight departments, are used to briefings that are short, loosely structured and light on detail. Not much forward planning, not much threat assessment. They deal with it as it comes.

Threat and error management (TEM) is the buzzword at the larger operators nowadays. In the sim, I give experienced candidates a scenario and ask them to present the threats for the day. With these pilots it's clear that assessing threats in a standardised way isn't in their toolbox, and neither is thinking strategically, because their own flight ops never required it. The expectation at a major airline is that every threat has to be talked about, along with how you'll mitigate it.

Then the failures come. They deal with them, but it's haphazard, made up on the go, and it often leads to rushed decisions, missed checklists and gut reactions. The outcome might be good, because these are experienced pilots. The process is what lets them down. Major airlines expect structured decision making with FORDEC, DODAR or something like it, even if you've already reached the decision. If your failure management is a creative process, where you have to think a lot outside the box, chances are your airline never introduced a standardised failure management process.

But what about Sully?

Whenever I talk about this, someone brings up Sully. Airline pilots need to think outside the box, they say. What happens when the situation isn't written down anywhere?

More often than not, the process is what keeps us out of trouble in the first place. And when a failure does need creativity, a standardised failure management process is still what structures your thinking and makes sure nothing is overlooked.

Sully's own flight shows it. Seconds before the birds, he and his first officer were completing the after takeoff checklist, by the book. When both engines failed, he took control with a clear announcement "my aircraft", and his first officer went straight into the engine dual failure checklist, even though it was written for a failure at altitude. The creative decisions, starting the APU straight away and choosing the Hudson, were built on top of that structure. The process freed up their heads for the decisions only they could make.

This is not something you can learn quickly, or cram for in the weeks before an assessment.

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